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Abstract: The delivery of a framework in place for secure application development is of real value for 
application development teams to integrate security into their development life cycle, especially when a 
mobile or web application moves past the scanning stage and focuses increasingly on the remediation or 
mitigation phase based on static application security testing (SAST). For the first time, to the author’s 
knowledge, the industry-standard Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) top 10 vulnerabilities 
and CWE/SANS top 25 most dangerous software errors are synced up in a matrix with Checkmarx 
vulnerability queries, producing an application security framework that helps development teams review 
and address code vulnerabilities, minimise false positives discovered in static scans and penetration tests, 
targeting an increased accuracy of the findings. A case study is conducted for vulnerabilities scanning of a 
proof-of-concept mobile malware detection app. Mapping the OWASP/SANS with Checkmarx 
vulnerabilities queries, flaws and vulnerabilities are demonstrated to be mitigated with improved efficiency.   
Keywords: Application Security; Checkmarx; Malware Detection; OWASP Top 10; SANS Top 25; Static 
Application Security Testing; Vulnerability Mapping  
 
1. Introduction 
With the prevalence of Internet of Things devices [1] and unprecedented flows of data [2] in the 
4G to 5G revolution [3–5] at an exponential pace, the security of web and mobile applications is being 
increasingly challenged and has gained considerable research interest underpinning a wide variety 
of industries beyond banking, financial services and insurance (BFSI), such as e-commerce [6], 
healthcare, telecommunications [7], media, entertainment, retail, education, as well as government 
and national defense. In this respect, there is arguably an ongoing need for investing massively in the 
application security sector which enables technological advances for a smarter world. Valued USD 4 
billion in 2019, the sharply growing global market in application security is projected to reach USD 9 
billion by 2022, and USD 15.25 billion by 2025 at a compound annual growth rate of 25% [8–10].  
The amount of easily downloaded mobile applications is constantly on the increase meaning 
that mobile phones are increasingly vulnerable to malware and other malicious code [10]. Currently, 
the use of mobile anti-malware systems is not widespread with customers complaining that 
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advertisements and irritating notifications discourage them from using scanners. A customisable 
anti-malware application is developed in this work which scans APK code files from all other 
downloaded applications and uses machine learning algorithms to identify potentially malicious 
code, providing an advert-free experience with only necessary notifications. 
Note that embedding security into an application development lifecycle (DLC) encompasses a 
set of different techniques [11] and assessments at different stages, e.g. Static Application Security 
Testing (SAST) [12] at an early stage of DLC, and Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) [13] 
at testing and operation stages. SAST scans source code like a white box testing from the inside out, 
while DAST implements black box testing of the runtime behavior while executing it from the outside 
in. Comprehensive application security solutions are highly desirable to maximise the coverage of 
ever-evolving cyberattacks. Among the industry standards of the most critical application security 
risks, Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 [14] and SANS Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE) top 25 most dangerous software errors [15, 16] are well acknowledged. 
However, few studies to our knowledge have synced up and mapped the OWASP top 10 with the 
SANS top 25. This work bridges the gap by performing SAST using Checkmarx, a state-of-the-art 
source code static scanning tool to identify flaws and vulnerabilities, with the advantages and 
limitations reviewed in Section 2. A survey on OWASP risk rating methodology is presented in 
Section 3, followed by the code vulnerabilities mapping into a novel matrix of OWASP Top 10 and 
SANS top 25 in Section 4 for optimising the checkmark based SAST. A case study incorporating the 
proposed vulnerabilities mapping is demonstrated for the anti-malware application in Section 5.  
2. Current Status of SAST based on Checkmarx 
In contrast with other application security testing methods (such as DAST which struggles to 
adequately identify crucial problems within the application layer nor indicate how or where to fix 
them), SAST based on un-compiled source code analysis offers comprehensive solution into 
vulnerable patterns and coding flaws from the root up [12]. Specifically, the advantages of 
Checkmarx-based SAST are summarised below:  
 Integrated into delivery pipelines. The SAST service aims at not only providing 
assurance to security solution consultants, but also enabling developers to write and 
deliver secure code - this is primarily achieved by integrating the SAST tools into the 
established development and/or delivery pipeline processes which helps developers 
discover and fix vulnerabilities long before a project reaches the testing phase. 
 Fast and automated. Checkmarx-based SAST technology identifies critical 
vulnerabilities (e.g. SQL injection and cross-site scripting), allowing instant and 
relatively accurate feedback on the code with automation, e.g. precisely locating the line 
number with flaws.  
 Low cost. The ability to remediate issues as they arise makes it ideal for integration 
within the software development lifecycle (SDLC), which saves precious time, 
remediation efforts and expenses. 
However, the current status of SAST tools is susceptible to the following drawbacks [17, 18].   
 A large number of false positives and negatives reported, which struggles to confirm 
that an identified security issue is an actual vulnerability. As a consequence, 
considerable effort is required for developers to manually identify and remediate the 
issues. 
 A limited percentage of application security flaws can be found automatically. It is still 
challenging to automatically locate a few types of security vulnerabilities (e.g. 
authentication problems, access control issues, insecure use of cryptography, etc).   
 Limited code coverage, i.e. SAST struggles to locate issues in libraries, configurations, 
and frameworks, since they are not represented in the code. 
 The incapability of reviewing compiled source code and identifying business logic 
vulnerabilities. 
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3. Methodology in OWASP Risk Rating  
Driven by an opensource application security community, the OWASP Top 10 is an industry-
standard of the most critical application security risks. The metrics of OWASP is based on a couple 
of likelihood factors, e.g. weakness prevalence, detectability, exploitability, and technical impact 
factor [19]. As illustrated in Figure 1 below, the risk rating of the flaws proposed by OWASP is 
calculated based on two steps. First, average three likelihood factors (i.e. prevalence, detectability, 
and exploitability), obtaining a likelihood rating. The scale of each risk likelihood factor ranges from 
1 (low) to 3 (high). Second, multiply the obtained likelihood rating with a technical impact factor 
ranging from 1 (low) to 3 (high).  
 
Figure 1. Methodology of Calculating the OWASP Top10 Risk Rating. 
Based on the above risk rate calculating mechanism, the top 10 vulnerabilities in 2017 [14] are 
summarised with the corresponding likelihood factors detailed in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Decomposition Analysis of the OWASP Top 10 (Horizontal Axis: 1. Injection Attack, 2. Broken 
Authentication, 3: Sensitive Data Exposure, 4. XML External Entities (XXE), 5. Broken Access Control, 6. 
Security Misconfiguration, 7. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), 8. Insecure Deserialization, 9. Using Components with 
Known Vulnerabilities, 10. Insufficient Logging and Monitoring). 
Over the last few years, attack methods [8–13] have grown with the evolution of fundamental 
technology and architecture of applications (e.g. JavaScript attacks [20], and attacks on cloud-
computing services [21]), and hence the update [14] of OWASP Top 10 as illustrated in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1. Evolution of OWASP Top 10 from 2013 to 2017 [14]. 
 
4. Novel OWASP-SANS Vulnerabilities Mapping 
One of the novelty in this work is mapping the co-occurrence of high-profile vulnerability types 
from both OWASP Top 10 and CWE/SANS Top 25. The obtained matrix is presented in Table 2 
according to up-to-date documentation, i.e. 2017 for OWASP [14] and 2019 for CWE/SANS [16].  
Table 2. A Novel Vulnerabilities Mapping based on OWASP-SANS/CWE. 
OWASP Rank OWASP Vulnerability SANS CWE ID 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
Injection 
CWE-78: OS Command Injection (Improper Neutralization of Special 
Elements used in an OS Command) 
CWE-89: SQL Injection 
CWE-94: Code Injection 
CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type 
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check 
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Broken Authentication 
CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function 
CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts 
CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials 
CWE-807: Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision 
CWE-862: Missing Authorization 
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization 
 
3 
 
Sensitive Data Exposure 
CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data 
CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information 
5 Broken Access Control CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path 
CWE-285: Improper Authorization 
 
6 
 
Security Misconfiguration 
CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges 
CWE-676: Use of Potentially Dangerous Function 
CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource 
7 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation 
(Cross-Site Scripting) 
8 Insecure Deserialization CWE-134: Use of Externally Controlled Format String 
 
 
9 
 
Using Components with 
Known Vulnerabilities 
CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound 
CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm 
CWE-759: Use of a One-way Hash Without a Salt 
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5. SAST Demonstration on a Proof-of-concept Malware Detection Prototype   
A mobile antivirus software prototype for an Android phone is developed, targeting the 
functionality of scanning a phone for known flaws and detecting unknown vulnerabilities. The main 
functional requirements are summarised as follows:   
 Customise scan schedule or force immediate scans.  
 Monitor potential incoming threats before they are downloaded onto the device.  
 Quarantine or block applications that are high-risk and vulnerable. 
 View past trends in found vulnerabilities.  
 Learn about the dangers of leaving a mobile phone insecure and other cyber-threats. 
 Advert-free experience with only necessary notifications. 
Checkmarx is employed to perform SAST on the Bitbucket source repository, examining the 
blueprint of the application without executing the code. By carefully investigating file locations that 
reported by the Checkmarx vulnerability queries, we observe that 90% of the issues originate from 
the externally developed libraries used in the python framework (Flask and TensorFlow), which are 
considered out of scope (marked yellow in Table 3 below) and filtered for a rescan. Only the file 
internally developed (marked in red below) needs more remediation attention at this stage. The 
statistics of the initial scanning covering the whole Bitbucket source repository and the rescanning 
excluding the aforementioned external libraries are reported in Table 4.  
Table 3. Checkmarx Initial Scan of the Whole Repository including all Libraries.  
 
Table 4. Scanning Statistics of the Bitbucket Source Repository. 
 Lines of Code Scanned Scan Time Files Scanned Coding Language 
Initial Scan 137747 1h:56m:42s 605 Python and JS 
Rescan  3116 0h:01m:01s 198 Python and JS 
Rescan results are analysed in Figures 3 and 4, with 17 vulnerabilities reported in total, exhibiting 
varying degrees of severity (categorised in high, medium and low). Checkmarx vulnerability queries 
are mapped with the proposed matrix of OWASP Top 10 and SANS CWE in Table 5, producing a 
state-of-the-art vulnerabilities matrix guiding application development teams and application 
security consultants for code remediation.    
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Figure 3. Checkmarx Rescanning Results Summary and Locations of the Most Vulnerable Files. 
 
Figure 4. Checkmarx Rescanning Results of the Top 5 Vulnerabilities. 
Table 5. OWASP-SANS Vulnerabilities Mapping with Checkmarx Vulnerability Queries.  
 
The above flaws (7 highs and 6 mediums as mentioned in Figure 4) are remediated accordingly 
incorporating the matrix of Checkmarx queries, OWASP, and SANS, as demonstrated by the final-
round of Checkmarx scanning result shown in Figure 5. Only 1 low vulnerability remains, indicating 
that the application development team can prove closure of the main vulnerabilities.  
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Figure 5. Checkmarx Third-round Scanning Results (Compared with the Second-round Scanning). 
6. Conclusion 
This work reviews the recent advances in static application security testing (SAST) and proposes 
a novel matrix of vulnerabilities mapping based on synchronising the industry-standard OWASP top 
10 vulnerabilities, SANS/CWE top 25 most dangerous software errors, and Checkmarx vulnerability 
queries. With the produced application security framework, enhanced code integrity is demonstrated 
for a proof-of-concept malware detection application in Android devices through 3 rounds of 
Checkmarx-based SAST which assists decision making in flaws remediation and vulnerabilities 
mitigation. The OWASP-SANS matrix-based security framework pioneered in this work can 
potentially be integrated with other state-of-the-art SAST scanners to expand the security testing 
scenarios for mobile and web applications.  
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